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The ICS Three-Step: A Procedural Alternative for 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
and Derivative Liability in the Online Setting 
Eric Taubel* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In late 2006, submarine sandwich purveyor Quiznos 
invited its customers to participate in the “Quiznos vs. Subway 
TV Ad Challenge” by creating and submitting their own 
advertisements that compared the quality of Quiznos’ subs 
with those of their chief rival, Subway.1 The user generated 
advertisements were submitted to and available on the website 
meatnomeat.com.2 Subway immediately filed suit against 
Quiznos,3 alleging that the ads contained false and misleading 
                                                          
© 2011 Eric Taubel. 
*J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; M.A. 2007, 
University of Virginia; B.A., 2005, University of Georgia. 
 1. Doctor’s Assocs. v. QIP Holders, L.L.C., No. 3:06-cv-1710, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 28811, at *3–4 (D. Conn. Apr. 18, 2007); see also Louise Story, 
Can a Sandwich Be Slandered?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2008, at C1. 
 2. While the www.meatnomeat.com domain name that was used for the 
contest now directs users to the Quiznos home page, a number of users posted 
their ads to YouTube as well. See, e.g., Createmovement, Anything for 
Quizno’s, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3RaUAPp8w1o (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2011) (woman prefers man with Quiznos sub); Dianeroone, 
Quiznos Contest Ad, YOUTUBE, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d9w0wAw5Kb8 (last visited Jan. 23, 2011) 
(market researcher prefers Quiznos); Junno1616, Quiznos Commercial, 
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nzFK7977DjM (last visited Feb. 
4, 2010) (guy sells Subway gift card to buy Quiznos); Pu4f, Quiznos vs Subway, 
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_xv2tS63kPI (last visited Jan. 
23, 2011) (parodying the infamous diner scene in When Harry Met Sally); 
xxxunderthegunxxx, Quiznos Commercial, YOUTUBE, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GKaMdH6RbMw (last visited Jan. 23, 2011) 
(guy prefers eating sandwich to kissing girl). 
 3. Subway also named as a defendant iFilm, the website company 
running and hosting the contest. iFilm “was an online archive of short films, 
movie trailers, and other video clips of interest.” The site has since been sold 
and no longer operates as a video clip website. 
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information in violation of the Lanham Act.4 Quiznos and iFilm 
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted5 claiming immunity under § 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA).6 The court denied 
the motion, holding that the immunity provision was an 
affirmative defense and as such not valid grounds for a 
dismissal.7 This holding was contrary to the approach adopted 
by many of the courts that have addressed the issue, which 
holds that the immunity provisions of § 230 can form the basis 
of a 12(b)(6) motion.8 
Congress passed the CDA in 1996.9 A smaller provision 
within the CDA, the Internet Freedom and Family 
Empowerment Act,10 provided immunity to interactive 
computer services (ICS)11 from being held liable for torts 
committed by users of the service.12 Courts have interpreted 
this immunity in a broad and sweeping manner,13 making it 
                                                          
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IFilm (last visited Nov. 2, 2008). Wikipedia 
generally does not meet the standards of reliability required for scholarly 
work, but cf. Amy Bauer, Note, Blogging on Broken Glass: Why the Proposed 
Free Flow of Information Act Needs a Specific Test for Determining When 
Media Shield Laws Apply to Bloggers, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 747, 771 n.6 
(2009) (arguing that Wikipedia is an appropriate source for newer technologies 
and information sources). 
 4. 15 U.S.C. §1125 (2006); Doctor’s Assocs., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28811, 
at *1. 
 5. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 6. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). 
 7. Doctor’s Assocs., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28811, at *6. 
 8. See, e.g., Universal Commc’n. Sys. v. Lycos, 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 
2007); Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7735, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
53246 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. 
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 544 (E.D. Va. 2008); Global 
Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, L.L.C., No. 07-956-PHX-FJM, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 77551 (D. Ariz. Oct. 10, 2007); Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91-DF-
CMC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93348 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006); MCW, Inc. v. 
BADBUSINESSBUREAU.COM, L.L.C., No. 3:02-CV-2727-G, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 6678 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2004). 
 9. Codified in scattered sections of Title 47 of the United States Code. 
 10. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). 
 11. “The term “interactive computer service” means any information 
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer 
access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service 
or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or 
services offered by libraries or educational institutions.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) 
(2006). 
 12. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2006). 
 13. See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs. v. QIP Holders, L.L.C., No. 3:06-cv-1710, 
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nearly impossible for any plaintiff to successfully hold an ICS 
liable for the tortious behavior of a third party. Early cases 
applied the immunity to access software providers,14 such as 
America Online, CompuServe, and Prodigy.15 Courts are 
increasingly applying immunity to web-based applications as 
well, such as Yahoo!, Craigslist, CafePress, MySpace, and 
Facebook.16 
While the application and scope of the immunity granted is 
in legal flux,17 the more interesting legal issue surrounding  § 
230 is the extent to which the immunity granted may serve as a 
basis for a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Some courts have held 
that the immunity granted in § 230 should be interpreted as an 
affirmative defense, thereby precluding a 12(b)(6) motion.18 A 
number of other courts have held that immunity under § 230 is 
valid grounds for a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.19 
                                                          
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28811, at *5 (D. Conn. Apr. 18, 2007). 
 14. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(4). These companies are often referred to as 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs), however, that language is not used in § 230.  
Section 230 divides the Internet into: interactive computer services (ICSs), 
information content providers (ICPs), and access software providers. 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(f)(2)–(4). 
 15. See Ken S. Meyers, Wikimmunity: Fitting the Communications 
Decency Act to Wikipedia, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 163 app. (2006) (charting the 
development of § 230 jurisprudence, of key importance in the 
disproportionately high number of cases in the early years of § 230 case law 
that names Internet Service Providers as the defendant. In the first 4 years 6 
out of 12 cases name AOL as the defendant.). 
 16. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 05-36189, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 20053 
(9th Cir. June 22, 2009) amended by Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 05-36189, 
2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 21308 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 2009); Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 
665 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Ill.2009); Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 
1193 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7735, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 53246 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009); Riggs v. MySpace Inc., No. 
3:2008-247, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37109 (W.D. Pa. May 5, 2009); Curran v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:07-0354, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12479 (S.D.W. Va. 
Feb. 19, 2008); Doe II v. MySpace Inc., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 148, (Cal. Ct. App. 
2009); Finkel v. Facebook, Inc., No. 102578/09, N.Y. slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Sept. 16, 2009). 
 17. Compare Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1167–
68 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding § 230 did not apply to a website which allowed 
users to engage in discriminatory housing practices) with Chi. Lawyers’ 
Comm. for Civ. Rights Under Law v. Craigslist, 519 F.3d 666, 671–72 (7th Cir. 
2008) (holding § 230 as a bar to claims arising under the Fair Housing Act). 
 18. E.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 565 F.3d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 2009), 
amended by Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) and Barnes 
v. Yahoo!, No. 05-36189, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 20053 (9th Cir. June 22, 2009); 
Doctor’s Assocs., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28811, at *6; Novak v. Overture 
Servs., 309 F. Supp. 2d 446, 452 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 19. E.g., Gibson, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53246, at *6; Nemet Chevrolet, 
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This issue highlights the current tension between new 
technologies and the historically driven rules of American law. 
New technologies present both opportunities and challenges to 
the American legal system.20 In the case of immunity from 
derivative liability,21 technological advances have made 
applying old legal standards difficult, if not impossible. In fact, 
the drafters of § 230 seemed to recognize this reality, and 
created a grant of immunity to online publishers and 
distributors that far exceeded any protection available to 
traditional publishers and distributors.22 In doing so Congress 
was attempting to enforce a series of policy choices that 
essentially all, at core, recognized the Internet’s promise and 
possibility was tied to its openness.23 
While these policy concerns which also motivate the desire 
to enlarge (or at least not constrict) § 230 immunity are wise 
and should be heeded, at present they risk subverting the legal 
rights of plaintiffs. A bright-line rule that ICSs are granted 
complete immunity to any action in which they are to be held 
liable as the speaker or publisher of content generated by a 
third party is judicially useful. This approach, however, 
neglects the evolutionary reality of Internet content.24 In the 
                                                          
Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 544, 550 (E.D. Va. 2008); 
Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, L.L.C., No. 07-956-PHX-FJM, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77551, at *5–6 (D. Ariz. Oct. 10, 2007); Doe v. Bates, 
No. 5:05-CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93348, at *9–10 (E.D. Tex. 
Dec. 27, 2006). 
 20. See, e.g., David Liebow, Note, DWI Source Code Motions after 
Underdahl, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 853 (2010) (analyzing the issue of 
access to the Intoxilyzer 5000 source code in Minnesota); J. Robert Schlimgen, 
Note, Virtual World, Real Taxes: A Sales and Use Tax Adventure Through 
Second Life Starring Dwight Schrute, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 877 (2010) 
(analyzing the problems posed by virtual worlds on the legal issue of taxation). 
 21. Being held liable for the actions committed by users of the interactive 
service provided. 
 22. See Varty Defterderian, Note, Fair Housing Council v. 
Roommates.com: A New Path for Section 230 Immunity, 24 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 563, 570 (2009) (citing Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 513 (Cal. 
2006)); Cecilia Ziniti, Note, The Optimal Liability System for Online Service 
Providers: How Zeran v. America Online Got it Right and Web 2.0 Proves It, 23 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 583, 587 (2008) (citing Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 
F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997)). 
 23. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2006). 
 24. See Kerry Coffman & Andrew Odlyzko, The Size and Growth Rate of 
the Internet, FIRST MONDAY, Oct. 1998, at 1, available at 
http://131.193.153.231/www/issues/issue3_10/coffman/index.html. 
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years immediately following the passage of § 230, the 
identification of an ICS was relatively straightforward.25 The 
task has, over time, become a more fact-intensive analysis.26 
This necessarily precludes its use as the basis of a 12(b)(6) 
motion. That is, in many cases there exists a material question 
of fact as to whether the defendant is an ICS or whether the 
defendant has in fact become a content provider.27 To the 
extent this is a question to be resolved the use of § 230 as the 
basis for a 12(b)(6) motion seems inappropriate. 
This Note argues that a uniform approach should be 
crafted that does not force plaintiffs to plead around § 230 
immunity, yet still allows for judicial efficiency when it is clear 
on the face of the complaint that the defendant is entitled to     
§ 230 immunity. Part I of this Note examines the legislative 
history and intent of § 230, the scope and history of § 230’s 
application, the standards for evaluating whether an 
affirmative defense is appropriately brought under a 12(b)(6) 
motion, and finally the current split in approaches as to 
whether § 230 can support a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Part II 
assesses the strengths and weaknesses of allowing § 230 to 
form the basis of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and the strengths 
and weakness of classifying § 230 as an affirmative defense 
that cannot support a motion to dismiss. This Note concludes 
that courts should adopt a standard that § 230 is an affirmative 
defense that cannot support a 12(b)(6) motion, but—using the 
court’s power to request a response28—should force plaintiffs to 
address the defense prior to the opening of discovery. 
 
 
                                                          
 25. The very language of § 230 indicates the extent to which the drafters 
were targeting Internet access providers. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2006) 
(“[i]ncluding specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet 
. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 26. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1166–
67 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 27. Id. 
 28. FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a)(7). 
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A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND INTENT OF THE 
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT 
Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 199629 in 
an attempt to regulate the Internet, which was still in its 
infancy.30 Congress was partially motivated to change the 
telecommunications regulatory scheme by the recent decision of 
a New York trial court in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy 
Services.31 
In Stratton Oakmont, Prodigy, an internet service provider, 
was held liable for the libelous statement of a third party 
posted to a bulletin board32 hosted on Prodigy’s network.33 
Prodigy held itself out as a family friendly portal to the 
Internet that heavily monitored and edited the content 
appearing on its various bulletin boards. The court analogized 
the role of Prodigy to that of a newspaper, and using a 
publisher theory of liability found for the plaintiff.34 This result 
threatened the open nature of the Internet by incentivizing 
internet service providers to either heavily censor content or 
completely deny users the ability to contribute content. 
The first two subsections of § 230 expressly reveal (a) the 
congressional findings relating to the provision, as well as, (b) 
                                                          
 29. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (1996) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 30. Remarks on Signing Telecommunications Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 215 (Feb. 8, 1996). 
 31. Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs., No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. 
LEXIS 229, at *3–4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 25, 1995). The congressional approval 
of such action can be seen in 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3) (2006). See H.R.  REP. NO. 
104-458, at 194 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10 (“One of the specific 
purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any 
other similar decisions which have treated such providers and users as 
publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because they have 
restricted access to objectionable material.”). 
 32. “Computer bulletin boards are public areas on an electronic network 
where users may post messages and read messages previously posted by 
others.” Edward J. Naughton, Note, Is Cyberspace A Public Forum? Computer 
Bulletin Boards, Free Speech, and State Action. 81 GEO. L.J. 409, 441 (1992) 
(Citing Loftus E. Becker, Jr., The Liability of Computer Bulletin Board 
Operators for Defamation Posted by Others, 22 CONN. L. REV. 203, 211–12 
(1989)). 
 33. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *17–18. 
 34. Id. at *10–11. 
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the policy rationales undergirding the enactment of the 
provision.35 These sections read as a strong legislative rebuke 
of the decision in Stratton Oakmont. These sections have been 
invoked in litigation that extends beyond the immunity 
provided in § 230.36 
The immunity granting provision of § 230 of the CDA 
provides: 
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of 
offensive material 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated 
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.37 
In passing the CDA, Congress attempted to balance two 
competing interests, the growing concern that the Internet 
posed a potential threat to children, and the sense that the 
Internet’s potential lay largely in its unrestricted nature.38 
Congress attempted to achieve this balance by passing an 
amendment to 47 U.S.C. § 22339 which would outlaw indecent 
communication over the Internet, with a standalone provision 
(what would become § 230) that provided immunity to ICSs 
who sought to help curb indecent and obscene material by 
                                                          
 35. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)-(b) (2006). 
 36. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 566 (2002) (citing 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(a)(3) as evidence of the United States policy goals with respect to the 
Internet); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 
360 (2002) (Thomas, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)(citing 47 
U.S.C. § 230(b)(1) as evidence of Congressional policy with respect to the 
Internet). 
 37. 47 U.S.C. § 203(c)(1) (2006). 
 38. Compare S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 59 (1995) (“The information 
superhighway should be safe for families and children. The Committee has 
been troubled by an increasing number of published reports of inappropriate 
uses of telecommunications technologies to transmit pornography, engage 
children in inappropriate adult contact, terrorize computer network users 
through “electronic stalking” and seize personal information.”), with 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(a)(1)-(5) (2006) (showing that while the Senate committee had concerns 
about families that use the Internet, the Code finds that the Internet has 
flourished to the benefit of all citizens with minimal regulation); see also 
Meyers, supra note 15, at 172–74. 
 39. “Title V—known as the “Communications Decency Act of 1996” 
(CDA)—contains provisions that were either added in executive committee 
after the hearings were concluded or as amendments offered during floor 
debate on the legislation. . . . They are informally described as the “indecent 
transmission” provision and the “patently offensive display” provision.” Reno 
v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 858–59 (1997). 
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taking an active editorial role.40 The concern that animated 
Congress to enact § 230 was a fear that absent a safe harbor 
provision ICSs would not actively police content for fear of 
being held to have derivative liability as a publisher.41 
The tandem served as an attempt to manage these 
competing interests by making the Internet safe for families, 
without stifling “[t]he rapidly developing array of Internet and 
other interactive computer services available to individual 
Americans [which] represent an extraordinary advance in the 
availability of educational and informational resources to our 
citizens.”42 This balance, however, was upset when the 
Supreme Court struck down § 223 as unconstitutional in Reno 
v. ACLU.43 The decision in Reno thus left open only one half of 
the regulatory scheme designed to make the Internet both safe 
for children and safe from overreaching government 
involvement. 
B. THE SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF § 230 IMMUNITY 
In the 1997 case Zeran v. America Online, the Fourth 
Circuit became the first appellate court to interpret the scope of 
§ 230 immunity.44 Relying largely on the legislative history and 
intent written into § 230, the Zeran court held that § 230 
granted wide immunity to ICSs,45 and subsequent case law has 
                                                          
 40. Meyers, supra, note 15, at 165, 172–74; see also Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-
CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93348, at *11 (E.D. Tex. December 27, 
2006) (“The legislative history further buttresses the Congressional policy 
against civil liability for Internet service providers. One key proponent of an 
amendment containing the language of § 230 at issue explained that the 
existing legal system provides a massive disincentive for the people who might 
best help us control the Internet to do so.”) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 41. E.g., Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 718 So. 2d 385, 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1998). 
 42. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1) (2006). 
 43. Reno, 521 U.S. at 882 (“We agree with the District Court’s conclusion 
that the CDA places an unacceptably heavy burden on protected speech . . . .”). 
 44. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 45. See, e.g., id.; Defterderian, supra note 22, at 569–70; Ziniti, supra note 
22, at 585; Eric Goldman, Ninth Circuit Mucks Up 47 USC § 230 
Jurisprudence… AGAIN!?—Barnes v. Yahoo, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG 
(May 13, 2009, 8:04 PM), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/05/ninth_circuit_m.htm; Eric 
Goldman, 47 USC 230 Can Support 12b6 Motion to Dismiss—Gibson v. 
Craigslist, TECH.& MARKETING L. BLOG (June 18, 2009, 6:41 PM), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/06/47_usc_230_can.htm; Paul Alan 
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upheld that broad grant to include causes of action beyond 
defamation.46 Central to the broad construction of § 230 was 
the holding in Zeran that Congress did not intend to draw a 
distinction between distributors and publishers with respect to 
the safe harbor provision.47 While much of the early scholarly 
reaction to Zeran questioned the legitimacy of its interpretation 
of congressional intent, more recent scholarship has embraced 
the Zeran decision and challenged any perceived encroachment 
on the broad grant of § 230 immunity.48 
In addition to being the first appellate court to address       
§ 230 immunity, the Zeran court also set forth the test to 
determine if a defendant is due immunity under § 230.49 Under 
the Zeran test, courts must answer three questions:50 (1) 
whether a defendant is an ICS;51 (2) whether the content at 
issue was posted or contributed by a third party; and (3) 
whether the plaintiff’s cause of action attempts to treat the 
defendant as the speaker/provider of the content at issue.52 
In the years since the passage of the CDA, the Internet has 
changed from a passive experience, where “users observed, 
                                                          
Levy, Can a Section 230 Immunity Defense Be Raised on a Motion to Dismiss?, 
CONSUMER L. & POL’Y BLOG (MAY 8, 2009, 7:01 PM), 
http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2009/05/can-a-section-230-immunity-
defense-be-raised-on-a-motion-to-dismiss.html; Eugene Volokh, Craigslist Not 
Liable for Shooting That Used a Gun Sold Via Craigslist Ad, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (June 17, 2009, 12:41 PM), 
http://volokh.com/posts/1245256918.shtml. 
 46. See Ziniti, supra note 22, at 587 n.34 (citing Christopher Butler, 
Plotting the Return of an Ancient Tort to Cyberspace: Towards a New Federal 
Standard of Responsibility for Defamation for Internet Service Providers, 6 
MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV 247, 248, 254–56 (2000)). 
 47. “Any attempt to distinguish between “publisher” liability and notice-
based “distributor” liability and to argue that Section 230 was only intended to 
immunize the former would be unavailing. Congress made no distinction 
between publishers and distributors in providing immunity from liability.” 
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.C. 1998); Ziniti, supra note 22, 
at 588. 
 48. Compare Butler, supra note 46, at 250 (questioning Zeran’s outcome 
in light of congressional intent), with Defterderian, supra note 22, 577–82 
(showing that Butler’s earlier analysis of Zeran questions the validity of the 
decision while Defterderian’s later analysis is less critical). 
 49. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. 
 50. The Zeran court did not explicitly label these as a three-part test. 
Ziniti, supra note 22, at 586; see also Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. 
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 544, 548 (E.D. Va. 2008). 
 51. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2006). 
 52. Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 39 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001); 
Ziniti, supra note 22, at 586; Defterderian, supra note 22 at 567. 
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found, and exchanged content passively” to an active 
experience where “users creat[e] and generat[e] content for 
public or semi-public view.”53 In the early days of the Internet, 
the question of what constituted an ICS was invariably clearer. 
However, the shift away from ICSs as portals to the Internet,54 
combined with the rise of web-based content providers55 and 
Web 2.0,56 makes the question of who can claim § 230 
immunity more difficult.57 No longer are people greeted online 
by the mid-90s catch-phrase, “You’ve got mail!” Rather than 
using a dial-up modem and an internet service provider, people 
are permanently connected to the Internet. The way users 
engage the Internet has changed from passive and consumptive 
to active and generative. In this new environment, the key 
distinction, for § 230 purposes, of who created the content is 
anything but straightforward. 
The proliferation and alteration of the purposes and uses of 
the Internet has decreased the ease of delineating the speech of 
users from that of ICSs. As in Fair Housing Council v. 
Roommates.com, courts will hold liable those ICSs who induce 
a third party to commit tortious actions.58 In Roommates.com 
the court held Roommates.com liable for violations of the Fair 
Housing Act, due to illegally discriminating in housing 
selection based on race. The court reasoned that because 
Roommates.com offered users pull-down menus where they 
could select the race, sex, sexual orientation, and parental 
status of potential roommates that Roommates.com was a 
content provider and the speaker of the discriminatory 
content.59 
                                                          
 53. Ziniti, supra note 22, at 590. 
 54. E.g., AOL, EarthLink, Prodigy, etc. 
 55. E.g., Craigslist, eBay, Yahoo!, etc. 
 56. See generally Tim O’Reilly, What is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and 
Business Models for the Next Generation of Software, COMM. & STRATEGIES, 
First Quarter 2007, at 17. (defining Web 2.0 as a platform that delivers 
continually updated software whose utility depends on the interaction of its 
users). 
 57. For a discussion of the changes the Internet has undergone since the 
passage of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, with particular emphasis 
on the rise of Web 2.0 and user created content see Ziniti, supra note 22, at 
590–94. 
 58. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1169 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
 59. Some commentators have argued that this distinction ultimately 
invokes the logic of the Stratton court, for example, see Defterderian, supra 
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This turn in § 230 jurisprudence and shift in the way the 
Internet is used highlights the increasing difficulty in 
determining whether a defendant constitutes an ICS.60 
Moreover, the logic of Roommates.com turns the first inquiry 
under Zeran of whether the defendant is an ICS61 and therefore 
due immunity into a two-level inquiry, looking first to whether 
the defendant is an ICS, and then to whether the ICS was 
active or passive in the creation of the content in question.62 
C. THE CURRENT SPLIT IN APPROACHES TO § 230 AND MOTIONS 
TO DISMISS 
For the most part, academic commentary has focused on 
the substantive shape and scope of § 230 immunity, while 
largely ignoring its procedural implications.63 Given the nature 
of the inquiry, there are essentially two approaches to the 
question of whether § 230 can support a 12(b)(6) motion: either 
it can or it cannot.64 
                                                          
note 22, at 575. 
 60. Perfect 10 v. Google, No. CV 04-9484 AHM (SHx), 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 79200, at *24 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2008) (“The question whether any of 
Google’s conduct disqualifies it for immunity under the CDA will undoubtedly 
be fact-intensive. Neither party has proffered evidence sufficient for the Court 
to determine at this stage whether Google is entitled to CDA immunity.”). 
 61. This is a weighing of whether the defendant is either an ICS or an 
ICP. For definitions see 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2)-(3). 
 62. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162–63 (9th Cir. 2008); 
Defterderian, supra note 22, at 566. 
 63. See supra Part I.B. 
 64. There are, of course, intermediary approaches. Some courts will 
consider the filing of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss invoking the immunity 
clause of § 230 as a Rule 56 summary judgment motion. See, e.g., Zango, Inc. v. 
Kaspersky Lab, Inc., No. C07-0807-JCC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97332, at *4 
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 28, 2007), aff’d, 568 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Although 
initially presented as a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), Defendant Kaspersky 
USA’s motion is properly reviewed as a motion for summary judgment under 
Rule 56 because “matters outside the pleading [we]re presented to and not 
excluded by the court.”); Novak v. Overture Servs., 309 F. Supp. 2d 446, 452 
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that a court should generally look at a motion to 
dismiss based on § 230 immunity to be interpreted as either a 12(c) motion to 
dismiss or a summary judgment motion). Other courts, while recognizing the 
procedural benefits of a Rule 12(c) or Rule 56 motion, will hear the 12(b)(6) so 
long as it does not disadvantage the plaintiff. See, e.g., Global Royalties, Ltd. 
v. Xcentric Ventures, L.L.C., No. 07-956-PHX-FJM, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
77551, at *6 (D. Ariz. Oct. 10, 2007) (“We take a practical approach. If we 
thought plaintiff were [sic] procedurally disadvantaged, we would deny 
defendant’s motion and require one under Rule 56. . . . Whether we construe 
this motion as one under Rule 12(b)(6) or as an unenumerated 12(b) motion, 
we agree that the CDA defeats the defamation claim.”). 
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The difficulty, however, in this straightforward question 
arose recently in Barnes v. Yahoo! before the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals.65 The court initially held that § 230 was an 
affirmative defense that plaintiffs were not required to plead 
around: 
Although the district court dismissed this case under Rule 12(b)(6), 
section 230(c) provides an affirmative defense. The assertion of an 
affirmative defense does not mean that the plaintiff has failed to state 
a claim, and therefore does not by itself justify dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(6). Neither the parties nor the district court seem to have 
recognized this, but Yahoo ought to have asserted its affirmative 
defense by responsive pleading, which is the normal method of 
presenting defenses except for those specifically enumerated in Rule 
12(b). It might then have sought judgment on the pleadings under 
Rule 12(c) . . . . We hasten to clarify, all the same, that section 230 is 
an affirmative defense and district courts are to treat it as such.66 
This particular portion of the decision was roundly 
criticized.67 This portion of the decision was subsequently 
removed by the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc.68 
The approach arguing against the use of a 12(b)(6) motion 
rests largely on the contention that the immunity provision of  
§ 230 serves as an affirmative defense.69 This argument 
contends that to allow the use of § 230 as the basis for a 
12(b)(6) motion is to consider facts beyond the four corners of 
the complaint,70 which plaintiffs should not be required to 
                                                          
 65. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 565 F.3d 560 (9th Cir. 2009), amended by, 570 
F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 66.  Id. at 562 (citations omitted). 
 67. See Andrew R. Boortz, Ninth Circuit Amends Barnes v. Yahoo 
Decision; Resolves Split as to Application of the Communications Decency Act, 
ADLAW BY REQUEST (June 23, 2009), 
http://www.adlawbyrequest.com/2009/06/articles/in-the-courts/ninth-circuit-
amends-barnes-v-yahoo-decision-resolves-split-as-to-application-of-the-
communications-decency-act/; Goldman, Ninth Circuit Mucks Up 47 USC 230 
Jurisprudence….AGAIN!?—Barnes v. Yahoo, supra note 45; Levy, supra note 
45 (“The Ninth Circuit’s discussion of this point is dictum, and we can hope 
that, when controlling authority is cited, trial courts and other panels on the 
Court of Appeals will get it right”.”). 
 68. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 69. See, e.g., Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2003); Curran 
v. Amazon.com, No. 2:07-0354, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12479, at *32–33 (S.D. 
W. Va. Feb. 19, 2008); Novak, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 452. 
 70. Contra Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 718 So. 2d 385, 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1998) (stating that the lower court did not err in referencing information 
outside the four corners of the complaint when granting a 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss on the basis of § 230). 
121_TAUBEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2011  8:17 AM 
2011] THE ICS THREE STEP 377 
plead around—at least at this early stage in the litigation 
process.71 
The second approach argues that a 12(b)(6) motion is the 
appropriate avenue for the assertion of § 230 immunity72 
because the grant of immunity prevents the plaintiff from 
establishing a set of facts that could afford the plaintiff relief.73 
Some courts have held that, while affirmative defenses 
generally are beyond the scope of the complaint, there are 
situations in which the facts alleged in the complaint are 
sufficient to allow the affirmative defense to form the basis of a 
12(b)(6) motion—such as when the affirmative defense is the 
violation of a statute of limitations.74 In fact, a number of 
courts have found that § 230 similarly can be an affirmative 
defense that is discernable based on the facts alleged in a 
complaint.75 
 
                                                          
 71. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 657 (“Affirmative defenses do not justify 
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6); litigants need not try to plead around 
defenses.”). 
 72. It is important to recognize that this approach does not change the 
status of immunity in § 230 as an affirmative defense, but rather argues that 
the affirmative defense can be found on the face of the complaint. See, e.g., 
Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 544, 550 
(E.D. Va. 2008); Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7735, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 53246, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009). Moreover, when courts have 
recognized other affirmative defenses as the bases for 12(b)(6) motions to 
dismiss, they tend to invoke affirmative defenses which necessarily appear on 
the face of complaint. Rhynette Northcross Hurd, Note, The Propriety of 
Permitting Affirmative Defenses to Be Raised by Motions to Dismiss, 20 MEM. 
STATE U.L. REV. 411, 412–13 (1990). Thus, courts are particularly likely to 
allow a 12(b)(6) based on a statute of limitations defense, an immunity 
defense, or a statute of frauds defense. Id. at 413. These exceptions are, 
however, not absolute and courts often hold that questions of fact require 
further consideration. Id. at 413, n.11. 
 73. MCW, Inc. v. BADBUSINESSBUREAU.COM, No. 3:02-CV-2727-G, 
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6678, at *21 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2004). 
 74. Goodman v. PraxAir, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. Md. 2007) 
(citing Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 
(4th Cir. 1993)) (discussing asserting the validity of a statute of limitations 
affirmative defense as the basis for a 12(b)(6) motion when sufficient facts are 
alleged in the complaint). 
 75. See, e.g., Nemet, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 550 (“The Complaint focuses 
largely on Defendant’s publication of these comments by third-parties, 
therefore it is reasonable for the Court to conclude that Plaintiffs seek to hold 
Defendants responsible either as publishers or as speakers of third party 
content.”). 
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In 1996 Congress attempted comprehensive regulation of 
the burgeoning Internet through two separate pieces of 
legislation.76 The acts sought to balance the competing 
interests of child protection and free and open 
communication.77 In Reno the court struck down the 
prohibition on indecent and patently offensive communication 
on the Internet.78 What remained of the regulatory scheme 
crafted by Congress was the immunity granted to ICSs who 
took an active role in controlling content.79 
There is little consensus among courts over how to handle 
the question of whether § 230 can support a 12(b)(6) motion. 
Some courts have construed the safe harbor of § 230 as a 
complete bar to legal action, allowing the invocation of the 
immunity in a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.80 Other courts have 
held that the immunity is not a total bar to liability, but rather 
serves as an affirmative defense which is properly raised in an 
answer.81 The ambiguity created by these differing approaches 
reduces reliability and consistency and creates incentives for 
forum shopping. A uniform approach to the question is 
necessary. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Allowing a defendant to use the immunity provision of the 
CDA to form the basis of a motion to dismiss is not without 
merit. The approach allows for judicial economy, honors the 
legislative intent, and is in-line with recent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on the question of pleading sufficiency. However, 
this approach is not without its pitfalls. Allowing § 230 to form 
the basis of a 12(b)(6) motion is manifestly unfair to plaintiffs 
insomuch as it requires them to anticipate a possible defense 
and then address it in their complaint. Additionally, allowing   
§ 230 to form the basis of a 12(b)(6) motion subverts judicial 
                                                          
 76. See supra Part I.A. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 882 (1997). 
 79. It is of note that the title of the specific subsection of § 230 reads, 
“Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material.” 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006). 
 80. See supra Part I.B. 
 81. See, e.g., Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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efficacy in that it prevents courts from conducting a full and 
thorough analysis of the issues as required by Zeran. Finally, 
this approach fails to recognize that the changing landscape of 
the Internet has made answering the question of whether a 
defendant is an ICS a fact-intensive inquiry that requires more 
evaluation than is required in a motion to dismiss. 
At present there is not a uniform approach to how courts 
should handle a defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the 
immunity grant in § 230. This confusion creates problems with 
respect to predictability and also incentivizes forum shopping. 
Thus, it is important to adopt a uniform approach to the issue. 
This Note argues that when a defendant moves to dismiss 
under 12(b)(6), the court should use its authority under rule 
7(a)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to request that 
the plaintiff specifically address the question of § 230 
immunity. The court should then rule on the motion as a 12(c) 
motion on the pleadings. This approach does not force plaintiffs 
to plead around § 230 and yet still preserves judicial economy 
and defendant resources. 
A. BENEFITS OF ALLOWING § 230 TO FORM THE BASIS OF A 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Three strong arguments exist in favor of allowing § 230 to 
serve as the basis of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. First, 
allowing defendants to invoke § 230 in a 12(b)(6) motion 
promotes judicial economy by preventing cases that are clearly 
precluded from moving forward. Second, allowing § 230 to form 
the basis of a 12(b)(6) motion honors the policy goals behind the 
CDA by preserving a broad grant of immunity. Finally, 
allowing § 230 to form the basis of a 12(b)(c) motion aligns with 
recent Supreme Court decisions Ashcroft v. Iqbal82 and Bell 
Atlantic v. Twombly,83 which suggest that § 230 immunity can 
appropriately sustain a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 
1. Judicial Economy 
Allowing § 230 to form the basis of a 12(b)(6) motion 
promotes judicial economy in two ways: (1) courts can dismiss 
cases that will never win, even if they state a cognizable 
claim,84 and (2) courts can prevent strategic behavior by 
                                                          
 82. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 83. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 84. See MCW, Inc. v. BADBUSINESSBUREAU.COM, No. 3:02-CV-2727-
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plaintiffs attempting to manipulate the pleading rules in order 
to force the hand of the defendant.85 
First, given the scope of § 230, most claims arise when a 
plaintiff seeks to have the defendant remove content created by 
a third party.86 It is clear that in these situations the defendant 
is entitled to § 230 immunity. That is, both the plaintiff and 
defendant will readily agree that the defendant is an ICS, the 
content was posted or created by a third party, and the only 
causes of action available to the plaintiff are those which would 
hold the defendant liable as either a speaker or a publisher. In 
such a scenario, the Zeran test is met, and no amount of 
discovery would be able to prove otherwise.87 
The second concern arises when a strategic plaintiff is able 
to use the threat of discovery as a mechanism for strong-
arming a defendant into a settlement in which they agree to 
remove the offending content.88 In this way the plaintiff is able 
to accomplish his goal, in spite of the fact that legally it is the 
wrong result. Such abuse transforms the courts from arbiters of 
justice into tools for relief to be wielded by those plaintiffs with 
the necessary means and knowledge. Not surprisingly, these 
cases have drawn extensive coverage from legal bloggers, who 
not only ardently oppose any increased regulation of the 
Internet by legislatures but also are suspicious of legal 
decisions that potentially weaken the legal protection of ICSs. 
These bloggers have criticized the perceived weakening of § 230 
immunity by courts limiting its use as the basis for a 12(b)(6) 
                                                          
G, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6678, at *24 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2004). 
 85. Boortz, supra note 67 (“Thus, the CDA-as-an-affirmative-defense 
theory would create an incentive for defendants to settle cases for which they 
ought to receive protection, and create an incentive for plaintiffs to bring cases 
in the Ninth Circuit strictly for this reason.”). 
 86. See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 565 F.3d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 2009), 
amended by, 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009; Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 
327, 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 87. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. 
 88. See Andrew R. Boortz, Can the CDA Support 12(b)(6) Motion to 
Dismiss? Ninth Circuit Says ‘No’; New York District Court Says ‘Yes.’, ADLAW 
BY REQUEST (June 19, 2009), 
http://www.adlawbyrequest.com/2009/06/articles/in-the-courts/can-the-cda-
support-12b6-motion-to-dismiss-ninth-circuit-says-no-new-york-district-court-
says-yes/. This strategic behavior by plaintiffs would also cut against the 
policy concerns annunciated in § 230, specifically the incentive to develop new 
technologies. 
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motion.89 
The primary argument stemming from this concern is that 
if a 12(b)(6) motion were not available, strategic plaintiffs 
would be able to seek alternative relief through the legal 
system.90 Even though the court would be incapable of granting 
actual relief through an order, as the defendant would be 
immunized by § 230, the plaintiff could exploit the threat of 
costly discovery to fashion their own relief.91 Since removing 
the availability of 12(b)(6) would require that defendants file an 
answer to the complaint, the process of defending suits would 
be enlarged for ICSs.92 Defending suits would thus become both 
more costly and time intensive.93 Additionally, preventing a 
12(b)(6) motion in cases of § 230 immunity would incentivize 
ICSs to settle claims which would ultimately fail.94 The threat 
of discovery would then serve as an end-around on the 
immunity provision. 
Finally, there is a strong argument that the liberal rules 
allowing parties to amend their pleadings—courts generally 
allow plaintiffs leave to cure procedural defects in their 
complaints—supports the proposition that § 230 should be 
available to form the basis of a 12(b)(6) motion.95 The rationale 
                                                          
 89. See, e.g., Goldman, 47 USC 230 Can Support 12b6 Motion to 
Dismiss—Gibson v. Craigslist, supra note 45; Goldman, Ninth Circuit Mucks 
Up 47 USC 230 Jurisprudence….AGAIN!?—Barnes v. Yahoo, supra note 45; 
Levy, supra note 45; Volokh, supra note 45. 
 90. Even in the current climate where a majority of courts hold that a 
12(b)(6) is available, plaintiffs can find ways to strategically manipulate the 
legal system to get around the immunity provisions of § 230. Recently, 
plaintiffs have attempted to avoid the reach of § 230, and still get relief from 
ICSs, by filing suit against the person(s) who created the content on the 
offending ICS, and then requesting, as relief, the elimination of the offending 
content. These plaintiffs obtain a default judgment against the ICS user who 
posted the offending content, then take the order for injunctive relief and seek 
to enforce it upon the offending ICS. This strategy functions as an end-around 
the immunity of § 230 by allowing plaintiffs to gain the relief they initially 
sought, without ever having to litigate either the applicability of § 230 to the 
ICS or the merits of the underlying claim. Eric Goldman, A New Way to 
Bypass 47 USC 230? Default Injunctions and FRCP 65, TECH. & MARKETING 
L. BLOG (Nov. 10, 2009), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/11/a_new_way_to_by.htm. 
 91. See Boortz, supra note 88. This strategic behavior by plaintiffs would 
also cut against the policy concerns annunciated in § 230, specifically the 
incentive to develop new technologies. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3) (2006). 
 92. Levy, supra note 45. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Boortz, supra note 85. 
 95. Cf. Hurd, supra note 72, at 426. 
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invoked by courts for allowing use of §230 as an affirmative 
defense—the elements necessary to sustain the defense appear 
on the face of the complaint96—however, can be used to prevent 
the ability of the plaintiff to amend the complaint, since it is a 
legal (§ 230 immunity) and not procedural defect.97 
2. Policy Goals 
There are also strong policy rationales for allowing § 230 to 
form the basis of a 12(b)(6) motion. The strongest policy 
rationales for allowing a 12(b)(6) motion based on § 230 to 
defeat an otherwise valid claim are contained with the 
statutory language of the CDA.98 By passing the CDA, 
Congress hoped to effectuate five key policy goals: (1) promote 
the growth and evolution of the Internet and interactive 
media,99(2) preserve the unregulated nature of the Internet,100 
(3) increase user control over content,101 (4) remove barriers to 
software and other programs that allow parents to regulate and 
filter the content their children may access,102 and (5) regulate 
the Internet to the extent that criminal laws (specifically 
obscenity laws) are enforced.103 
Allowing plaintiffs to engage in protracted legal disputes 
by barring a 12(b)(6) motion would severely encumber policy 
goals one and three. ICSs would clamp down on expression for 
fear of increased liability: “[f]aced with potential liability for 
each message republished by their services, interactive 
computer service providers might choose to severely restrict the 
number and type of messages posted. Congress considered the 
weight of speech interests implicated and chose to immunize 
service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect.”104 
                                                          
 96. See, e.g., Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 718 So. 2d 385, 388 (Fla. App. 1998). 
 97. Id. at 389 (holding that “the complaint cannot be amended to 
overcome section 230 immunity.”) (emphasis in original). But see Novak v. 
Overture Servs., 309 F. Supp. 2d 446, 453 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“If Plaintiff wishes 
to substantively amend his claims, he must do so in accordance with the 
federal rules of civil procedure and the Court’s individual practice rules.”). 
 98. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). 
 99. Id. § 230(b)(1). 
 100. Id. § 230(b)(2). 
 101. Id. § 230(b)(3). 
 102. Id. § 230(b)(4). 
 103. Id. § 230(b)(5). 
 104. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F. 3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(emphasis added). 
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ICSs would be severely disincentivized, under a system 
where litigating content liability issues is protracted and costly, 
from developing more services and technologies because of the 
potential for greater and greater liability. Moreover, this 
regime would frustrate the third enunciated goal105—increased 
user control over content—insomuch as ICSs would be 
especially reluctant to develop and offer any services or 
technology where users would have greater input or control. 
Expanding user content would expand the universe of content 
that the ICSs would have to regulate and control in order to 
prevent potential suits which they would have to defend at 
least through the discovery stage. Additionally, allowing cases 
to move to discovery could undercut the free and open nature of 
the Internet by forcing ICSs to take an overly proactive role in 
filtering, editing, and controlling the content published.106 
3. Iqbal and Twombly 
The recent decisions by the Supreme Court, with respect to 
the detail required in a pleading, suggest that plaintiffs must, 
in order to meet the new 12(b)(6) burden, plead around  § 230 
or risk being dismissed from court.107 In Twombly the Court 
held that a complaint can withstand a motion to dismiss only 
once it has pled sufficient factual content to allow the Court to 
reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged 
malfeasance.108 Twombly further held that naked allegations 
absent “further factual enhancement”109 and “threadbare 
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 
conclusory statements of law” would not be enough to sustain a 
complaint against a motion to dismiss.110 
In the wake of Twombly and the uncertainty of its 
application,111 the Supreme Court ruled in Iqbal that the 
                                                          
 105. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3) (2006). 
 106. But see 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(2)(a) (2006) (granting immunity to ICSs that 
“voluntarily take[] [action] in good faith to restrict access to or availability of 
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, 
filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable . . . .”). 
 107. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 108. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. 
 109. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 
 110. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
 111. See, e.g., Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 6–11 (2010); Nicholas Tymoczko, Note, Between the Possible 
and the Probable: Defining the Plausibility Standard After Bell Atlantic Corp. 
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plausibility standard in Twombly required a two prong 
approach.112 In the first prong, the Court in Iqbal required that 
courts determine which allegations are nonconclusory and as 
such due a presumption of truth under the standards of a 
motion to dismiss.113  Under the second prong, after making 
those initial determinations, the Court then proceeds to the 
Twombly plausibility test.114 Given the higher bar established 
in Iqbal115 it might be argued that most, if not all, plaintiffs 
will be unable to defeat a § 230 based motion to dismiss, since 
on the face of the complaint it is likely that the elements of the 
defense will appear and thereby destroy the plausibility of 
relief.116 
B. BENEFITS OF CASTING § 230 AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The primary benefit to barring the safe harbor provisions 
of § 230 from forming the basis of a 12(b)(6) motion is that it 
preserves pleading integrity by allowing the plaintiff to bring 
the action and make her case, without forcing complex 
pleadings. Making 12(b)(6) unavailable to defendants wishing 
to invoke a § 230 immunity defense also cures three problems 
implicit in allowing a 12(b)(6) motion based on § 230: first, 
allowing a 12(b)(6) motion is incongruous with notice 
pleading;117 second, the use of § 230 as the basis of a 12(b)(6) 
motion misapprehends the nature of motions to dismiss;118 and 
third, in practice (if not in theory as well) the use of 12(b)(6) 
cuts short the Zeran test. Finally, holding the § 230 immunity 
to be an affirmative defense inapplicable in a 12(b)(6) motion is 
                                                          
v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 94 MINN. L. REV. 505, 513 (2010). 
 112. Tymoczko, supra note 111, at 506. 
 113. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009). 
 114. Id. 
 115. A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV 431, 445–
46 (2008). 
 116. This analysis however, likely carries the point too far. Such an 
interpretation of Iqbal would vitiate the requirement that affirmative defenses 
be affirmatively stated insomuch as this interpretation would allow a 
defendant to raise any affirmative defense on a 12(b)(6) motion. This in turn 
would require plaintiffs to not only raise every conceivable affirmative defense 
in order to raise their complaint from possible to the probable, but also to 
support each with more than conclusory statements of law. 
 117. See, e.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Curran v. Amazon.com, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 12479, *6–7 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56). 
 118. Cf. Hurd, supra note 72, at 422–24. 
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more likely to promote justice, in light of changes in the 
manner in which users interact with the Internet.119 
1. Incongruities with Current Pleading Regime 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a 
plaintiff must provide, “[a] short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”120 The 
Supreme Court has held that this requirement means that 
pleaders need only plead “[e]nough facts to state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.”121 By allowing an 
affirmative defense to form the basis of a 12(b)(6) motion, 
courts essentially require plaintiffs to anticipate and plead 
around the invoked immunity section. The statements and 
averments thus required by pleaders would assuredly 
constitute more than a short plain statement of facts, and 
would similarly contain more than the necessary facts to state 
a facially plausible claim.122 
2. Nature of a 12(b)(6) Motion 
A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the claim 
brought, and is granted when the pleader can prove no set of 
facts that would entitle the pleader to relief.123 A 12(b)(6) 
motion is successful when the complaint fails to advance a 
claim that, even if true, would allow the court to grant some 
form of relief to the petitioner. By contrast, the assertion of an 
affirmative defense functions not as a denial of wrongdoing, but 
rather as a mechanism for avoiding liability.124 Thus, the 
invocation of an affirmative defense as evidence of the lack of a 
stated claim is at the best counterintuitive, and more likely 
nonsensical.125 This suggests that the question of the degree to 
which a defendant is due § 230 immunity is a question 
requiring discovery to resolve.126 
                                                          
 119. See generally O’Reilly, supra note 56 (explaining the development of 
the Internet from Web 1.0 to Web 2.0). 
 120. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 121. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
 122. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 123. See, e.g., Hurd, supra note 72, at 424–25. 
 124. Id. at 422–23. 
 125. An affirmative defense admits that there is a claim, but offers a 
reason why liability should not attach. A motion to dismiss argues that the 
plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable legal claim upon which relief can be 
granted. 
 126. Curan v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12479, *31 (2008); 
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Additionally, motions to dismiss are to be adjudicated 
exclusively on the claims and allegations contained in the 
complaint.127 Since plaintiffs will rarely (if ever) allege the 
necessary facts to support an affirmative defense, it is 
procedurally problematic for courts to allow the immunity 
provisions of § 230 to form the basis of a 12(b)(6) motion.128 
That is, plaintiffs will often allege that in order for the court to 
successfully grant the motion to dismiss on the grounds of an 
affirmative defense, the court would have to look beyond the 
four corners of the complaint, which according to the plaintiff 
would be inappropriate.129 
3. Full Scope of the Zeran Test 
Courts that allow the immunity provisions of § 230 to form 
the basis of a 12(b)(6) motion do so at the expense of a full and 
developed analysis of the Zeran standard.130 The Zeran test 
requires a three part inquiry that assesses whether the 
defendant is an ICS, the content was posted by a third party, 
and if the plaintiff’s cause of action seeks to hold the defendant 
liable as either a speaker or publisher of that content.131 Courts 
that allow the defendant to invoke § 230 at the 12(b)(6) stage 
often hold that the status of the defendant as an ICS is clear 
from the face of the complaint.132 This, however, ignores the 
remaining two questions. A finding that the defendant is an 
ICS does not necessarily mean the other two questions will be 
answered affirmatively as well.133 
                                                          
see also Michael Erdman, Court: Section 230 Is an Affirmative Defense, Thus 
It’s (Generally) Not an Appropriate Basis For a Motion To Dismiss, ONLINE 
LIABILITY BLOG (Feb. 26, 2008), 
http://onlineliabilityblog.com/2008/02/26/court-section-230-is-an-affirmative-
defense-thus-its-generally-not-an-appropriate-basis-for-a-motion-to-dismiss/. 
 127. See Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 
2d 544, 548 (E.D. Va. 2008). 
 128. Id. See supra note 116 (arguing that to require plaintiffs to plead 
around affirmative defenses would fundamentally undermine the current 
pleading regime). 
 129. Contra Nemet, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 547–48 (“In addition to the 
complaint, the court may also examine documents incorporated into the 
complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial 
notice.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 130. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 131. See supra Part I.B. 
 132. See, e.g., Nemet, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 544. 
 133. While it is decidedly easier to answer the second and third questions 
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Nemet presents a clear example of this problem.134 The 
Nemet court held that, “[t]he crucial inquiry for determining 
immunity is the role of the Defendant as it pertains to the 
statements at issue in the Complaint.”135 Although the court 
engaged in an exhaustive discussion of the first element—the 
extent to which the defendant can be considered an ICS vis-à-
vis an information content provider—the court only briefly 
considered the extent to which the second and third elements 
are met. 136 The court succinctly found that, “[t]he complaint 
identifies the third-party information content providers. . . . 
The complaint focuses largely on Defendant’s publication of 
these comments by third-parties, therefore it is reasonable for 
the court to conclude that Plaintiffs seek to hold Defendant 
responsible either as publishers or as speakers of third party 
content.”137 In shortchanging the final two questions of the 
Zeran analysis, courts risk over broadening the scope of § 230 
by removing integral limits on its application.138 
4. Newly Fact-Intensive Inquiry 
The shift in the manner in which users engage the Internet 
and the rise of Web 2.0139 has made the identification of an ICS 
a more difficult task. The influx of user generated content 
(UGC) has substantially blurred the lines.140 Moreover, the 
application of § 230 in a blanket manner to any claim arising 
out of a suit against any defendant that can make a colorable 
                                                          
(if the content in question posted by a third party and if the plaintiff seeking 
to hold the defendant liable as either speaker or publisher, respectively), it is 
nonetheless important to consider them. Roommates.com provides a good 
example where the most interesting and legally complex portion of the 
decision dealt with the second question about who should be considered the 
author of the published content. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 
F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 134. Nemet, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 544. 
 135. Id. at 548. 
 136. Id. at 548–49. 
 137. Id. at 550. 
 138. Cf. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1171 (noting that applying the 
statute to all cases where data obtained from third parties is at issue would 
functionally retard the purpose and intent of the statute). 
 139. O’Reilly, supra note 56, at 18–19. 
 140. See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs. v. QIP Holders, L.L.C., No. 3:06-cv-1710, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28811, at *4 (D. Conn. Apr. 18, 2007) (the first 
‘example’ videos were likely generated by Quiznos, but the sites actual content 
was generated by users, which made the distinction between ICS and 
information content provider quite blurry). 
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argument that they constitute an ICS may push the application 
of § 230 well beyond the congressional intent that motivated 
the grant of immunity.141 
C. AN ALTERNATIVE: ANSWERING THE ANSWER AND JUDGMENT 
ON THE PLEADINGS 
Generally, when an affirmative defense is asserted in a 
12(b)(6) motion, the court will address the motion as either a 
summary judgment motion142 or a rule 12(c) 143 motion on the 
pleadings.144 In Zeran, the leading case on § 230 immunity, the 
court found in favor of the defendant on a 12(c) motion.145 
These avenues are generally unnecessary when the plaintiff 
does not challenge the defense, or the facts underlying it.146 
The jumbled mix of approaches to the application of § 230 
requires action to create uniformity. Courts should first require 
that the assertion of § 230 immunity be raised in an answer, 
and not on a 12(b)(6) motion. Second, courts should use the 
power granted to them under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to request a reply by the plaintiff to the answer of a 
defendant.147 This approach would be consistent with what 
some have called a “three-step pleading scheme.”148 The courts 
would give both parties an opportunity to adequately address 
the issue without opening of the costly process of discovery.149 
                                                          
 141. See, e.g., Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1178–79 
(9th Cir. 2009) (Fisher, J., concurring). 
 142. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 143. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). 
 144. Novak v. Overture Servs., 309 F. Supp. 2d 446, 451 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 145. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 335 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 146. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 147. FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a)(7). 
 148. Michael T.G. Long, Comment, The Replying Game: Making the Case 
for Adopting the Fifth Circuit’s Use of Particularized Replies in § 1983 Actions, 
34 SETON HALL L. REV. 389, 420 (2003). 
 149. This approach was initially advocated by the 5th Circuit Court of 
Appeals in the area of qualified immunity. See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 
1427, 1428 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Long, supra note 148, at 420. This 
approach has been at least accepted, if not endorsed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597–98 (1998) (“[T]he trial court 
must exercise its discretion in a way that protects the substance of the 
qualified immunity defense. It must exercise its discretion so that officials are 
not subjected to unnecessary and burdensome discovery or trial proceedings. 
The district judge has two primary options prior to permitting any discovery at 
all. First, the court may order a reply to the defendant’s or a third party’s 
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The 7(a)(7) and 12(c) approach is a better alternative to 
simply converting the 12(b)(6) to a rule 56 motion, insomuch as 
it functions similarly to a 12(b)(6) and closes litigation at an 
early stage. A rule 56 motion would allow plaintiffs to open up 
discovery and in doing so this approach would be encumbered 
by the same drawbacks related to removing the availability of 
the 12(b)(6) motion.150 Indeed, even critics of decisions which 
strip away the availability of a 12(b)(6) motion agree that the 
transition to a system in which defendants answer and 
simultaneously file a 12(c) motion will not substantially 
increase costs or burdens on time.151 
This “three-step pleading scheme” is able to achieve the 
benefits of the two approaches laid out above. It is able to 
achieve judicial efficiency without exposing defendants to 
unnecessary discovery costs.152 Additionally, by delaying the 
start of discovery, while allowing plaintiffs to meet their case, 
the three-step approach is better able to accomplish the policy 
goals in § 230.153 In allowing for both the plaintiff and the 
defendant to lay out their respective cases on the issue of § 230 
immunity, the court is also able to better effectuate the spirit of 
notice pleading.154 Moreover, the fuller development of the 
record makes conducting the Zeran test155 in its full extent 
more likely. The richer record also allows for a more nuanced 
weighing of the evidence with respect to Web 2.0 defendants. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Granting a 12(b)(6) motion before a plaintiff has the 
opportunity to argue that the defendant is beyond the scope of  
§ 230 seems patently unfair. At the same time, allowing 
plaintiffs to manipulate the federal rules of civil procedure and 
                                                          
answer under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a), or grant the defendant’s 
motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e).”). 
 150. See supra Part II.A.i. But see Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab Inc., 568 
F.3d 1169, 1172 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 151. Goldman, Ninth Circuit Mucks up 47 USC 230 
Jurisprudence…AGAIN!?—Barnes v. Yahoo, supra note 45. Goldman does 
argue, however, that a slow moving or ‘cautious’ judge may allow discovery to 
open even as a 12(c) motion pended before the court. 
 152. Cf. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 597–98. 
 153. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)-(5) (2006). 
 154. If notice pleading can be said to exist in the wake of Iqbal and 
Twombly. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 155. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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the legal process lacks judicial economy and saps judicial 
efficacy. The current split in approaches to this issue 
incentivizes plaintiff forum shopping, and given the lack of 
decisions at the Court of Appeals level, engenders 
unpredictability in the system. In order to mitigate these 
concerns, courts should adopt the “three-step pleading scheme” 
advocated in this article. That is, courts should convert a rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss to rule 12(c) motion on the pleadings, 
and under rule 7(a)(7) request a reply to the answer, thereby 
giving the plaintiff the opportunity to dispute the invocation of 
the affirmative defense. This allows for both fairness and 
judicial economy by removing all cases which are captured by 
the grant of immunity in § 230 and allowing those cases with 
genuine questions of fact (as related to the status of the 
defendant under § 230) to move forward. 
